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BEINOR v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS APPEALS OFFICE

Voter initiatives have not always been a part of America’s history.1 In fact, there
was a point in America’s history when no mechanism existed for average citizens to
initiate laws.2 However, during the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century,
many Americans grew concerned about the amount of concentrated power held by
wealthy state legislators.3 Consequently, particularly in the West, citizens pressed for
and gained adoption of “voter initiative”4 resolutions, amending various state
constitutions to enable average voters to have a direct voice in state lawmaking.5 This
is particularly noteworthy because it enables voters to bypass legislators to enact laws,
subject to some limitations.6 In addition, many state ballot measures involve highly
divisive and politically charged issues that legislators are unwilling to address through
legislative action because it could diminish the likelihood of their re-election.7 The
Colorado Supreme Court once noted that “[l]ike the right to vote, the power of
initiative is a fundamental right at the very core of our republican form of government.” 8

1.

See Elisabeth R. Gerber et al., Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds
to Direct Democracy vii (2001).

2.

See id.

3.

See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana
Case Study, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 221, 231 (2005). The Progressive Era, which lasted from 1880 to
1920, was a period marked by social activism and great political reform. See Maryann Zihala,
Rights, Liberties & the Rule of Law 183 (2005).

4.

The term “initiative” refers to the “electoral process by which a percentage of voters can propose
legislation and compel a vote on it by the legislature or by the full electorate. Recognized in some state
constitutions, the initiative is one of the few methods of direct democracy in an otherwise representative
system.” Black’s Law Dictionary 854 (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(2). For ease of
reference, this comment will use the terms “voter initiative” and “initiative,” but other sources may
reference “ballot initiatives.”

5.

See DuVivier, supra note 3, at 232–33 (“Currently, twenty-four states give their citizens some opportunity
to vote directly to adopt new laws or to amend their state constitutions.”). Additionally, voter “referenda”
amendments were also adopted. Id. While the terms “initiative” and “referenda” are often used
interchangeably, they are not one and the same. See Black’s Law Dictionary 854, 1393–94 (9th ed.
2009) (defining “initiative” as a “process by which a percentage of voters can propose legislation” and
defining “referendum” as “[t]he process of referring a state legislative act, a state constitutional
amendment, or an important public issue to the people for final approval by popular vote”). This case
comment will focus on a voter initiative that was passed by voters at the ballot, but enacted into law by
the state legislature.

6.

See Gerber, supra note 1 (“Every winning initiative gives government actors opportunities to make
implementation and enforcement decisions. When making these decisions, they regularly reinterpret,
and sometimes reverse, electoral outcomes.”). In many states, there are limitations on the subject matter
that can be voted on by referendum. These limitations are preserved by the insertion of a “safety clause.”
See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(3) (“The second power hereby reserved is the referendum, and it may
be ordered, except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or
safety, and appropriations for the support and maintenance of the departments of state and state
institutions . . . .”).

7.

See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 Yale
L.J. 107, 108 (1995).

8.

McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
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Yet, in a recent case, Beinor v. Industrial Claims Appeals Office, the Colorado
Court of Appeals issued a decision that undermined a recently passed voter initiative.9
In 2000, a voter initiative, referred to as the “Medical Marijuana Amendment,”
proposed an amendment to the Colorado Constitution to authorize the medical use
of marijuana for persons suffering from a debilitating medical condition.10 Despite
the Medical Marijuana Amendment’s passage, the court in Beinor upheld the denial
of unemployment benefits to a discharged employee who had been diagnosed with a
debilitating condition, solely because of his off-the-job use of marijuana for medical
purposes.11 This case comment contends that the court’s strained reading of the
Medical Marijuana Amendment—finding that the law merely decriminalized
marijuana use but did not create an affirmative right to this use—ignored the clear
will of voters and renders beneficiaries of medical marijuana psychologically and
financially vulnerable to losing necessary medications and diminishing their general
well-being. The precedent established by this opinion forces ill patients to choose
between employment (and the attendant receipt of state unemployment benefits) and
unemployment with the lawful treatment of a debilitating medical condition without
access to important benefits. Furthermore, this precedent could undermine the
public’s confidence in the century-old right of voter initiative.
In 1910, the Colorado Constitution was amended to include voter initiative and
referenda procedures.12 Despite the many steps and complicated formalities, Colorado
citizens have historically used the initiative process more expansively than citizens in
most other states.13 Initial proposals must be submitted, reviewed, commented on,
revised, and eventually submitted to the secretary of state.14 Once an independent
board agrees on the title of the initiative, signatures must be gathered and verified.15
An impartial analysis, referred to as a “Bluebook,” is prepared by the legislative
council staff and distributed to voters.16 When all these steps have been completed,
the initiative is put to a vote.
9.

See Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011).

10.

This comment will refer to the constitutional provision enacted and now contained in article XVIII,
section 14 of the Colorado Constitution as the “Medical Marijuana Amendment” or the “Amendment.”
However, some sources may reference “Amendment 20,” the common name used before the amendment
had been passed by voters.

11.

See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 971–78.

12.

See Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1) (“[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the general
assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act or item,
section, or part of any act of the general assembly.”).

13.

See DuVivier, supra note 3, at 233–34 (“Historically, Oregon, California, Colorado, North Dakota, and
Arizona have used the initiative process most extensively.”).

14.

See Colo. Const. art. V, § 1.

15.

See id.; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§1-40-106 to -111 (West 2012).

16.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§1-40-124 to -124.5 (West 2012); see Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(7.5)(a); see, e.g.,
Legis. Council of the Colo. Gen. Assemb., Research Pub. No. 475-6, An Analysis of the 2000
Statewide Ballot Proposals and Recommendations on Retention of Judges (2000) [hereinafter
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The proposed Medical Marijuana Amendment was placed on the November
2000 general election ballot.17 The Bluebook prepared by the Colorado Legislative
Council stated, in relevant part, that the Medical Marijuana Amendment
allows patients diagnosed with a serious or chronic illness and their care-givers
to legally possess marijuana for medical purposes. [This] proposal does not
affect federal criminal laws, but amends the Colorado Constitution to legalize
the medical use of marijuana for patients who have registered with the state. . . .
Patients on the registry are allowed to legally acquire, possess, use, grow, and
transport marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia. . . . Employers are not
required to allow the medical use of marijuana in the workplace.18

The Amendment title, as it appeared on the ballot, read, “An amendment to the
Colorado Constitution authorizing the medical use of marijuana for persons suffering
from debilitating medical conditions, and, in connection therewith, establishing an
affirmative defense to Colorado criminal laws for patients . . . and providing that no
employer must accommodate medical use of marijuana in the workplace.”19 Under
the Medical Marijuana Amendment scheme, physicians were neither required nor
permitted to prescribe marijuana, which would have violated federal law, but rather
were only able to sign “written documentation” verifying a patient’s need for medical
marijuana.20 Colorado then licensed the patient to use medical marijuana by issuing
a “registry identification card.”21
On November 7, 2000, Colorado voters passed the Medical Marijuana
Amendment by a margin of 53.8% to 46.2%.22 On December 28, 2000, the measure
became effective upon the proclamation of the governor.23 The text of the Medical
Marijuana Amendment is now a part of the Colorado State Constitution in article
XVIII, section 14, and is titled the “Medical Use of Marijuana Amendment.”24 Since
2000, guidelines have been adopted regulating the implementation of the medical
marijuana program.25 The language contained in article XVIII, section 14 remains
Bluebook 2000]. The ballot proposals contained in the Bluebook ought not to be confused with The
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
17.

See Bluebook 2000, supra note 16, at 1.

18.

Id.

19.

Id. at 35.

20. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(j) (defining written documentation as “a statement signed by a

patient’s physician or copies of the patient’s pertinent medical records”).
21.

Id. § 14(1)(g) (defining a registry identification card as a “document, issued by the state health agency,
which identifies a patient authorized to engage in the medical use of marijuana and such patient’s
primary care-giver, if any has been designated”).

22.

See Colorado Marijuana Act, amendment 20, Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/
Colorado_Marijuana_Act,_Amendment_20_(2000) (last visited Aug. 18, 2012).

23.

See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(11).

24.

See id. § 14.

25.

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-1.5-106 (West 2012) (originally enacted as § 25-1-107(1)(jj)
(2001)) (describing the powers and duties of the state health agency in implementing the medical
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identical to the language contained in “Amendment 20,” which the citizens of
Colorado approved through a vote at the ballot.26
Subsection (1) of article XVIII, section 14 defines the terms used in the remaining
provisions of section 14.27 Subsection (2) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in subsections (5), (6), and (8) of this section, a patient or primary
care-giver charged with a violation of the state’s criminal laws related to the patient’s
medical use of marijuana will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense
to such allegation” where the patient was previously diagnosed with a debilitating
medical condition, was advised by a physician that the patient might benefit from
marijuana use, and is in possession of the permitted amount of marijuana. 28 In
addition, subsection (2) provides that this “affirmative defense shall not exclude the
assertion of any other defense where a patient or primary care-giver is charged with
a violation of state law related to the patient’s medical use of marijuana.” 29
Subsection (4)(a) states that a “patient may engage in the medical use of marijuana,
with no more marijuana than is medically necessary to address a debilitating medical
condition.”30 Consequently, a patient’s medical use of marijuana is lawful if it does
not exceed “more than two ounces of a usable form of marijuana.”31 In addition, if a
patient possesses a greater amount of marijuana than permitted under subsection (4)
(a), subsection (4)(b) provides that the patient “may raise as an affirmative defense to
charges of violation of state law that such greater amounts were medically necessary
to address the patient’s debilitating medical condition.”32 Subsection (5)(a) provides
that “[n]o patient shall engage in the use of medical marijuana” in a way that either
endangers the health of any person or is in plain view of the general public. 33
Subsection (10)(b) states that “[n]othing in this section shall require any employer to
accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any work place.”34
Jason M. Beinor, a Colorado citizen, was experiencing severe headaches as a
result of a head injury he sustained from an assault and battery.35 To relieve his pain,
he consulted a licensed physician who recommended that Beinor use medical
marijuana program); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-406.3 (West 2012) (interpreting the constitutional
amendment and enacting criminal penalties in relation thereto).
26. Compare Bluebook 2000, supra note 16, at 35–42, with Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14.
27.

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(1).

28. Id. § 14(2)(a).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 14(4)(a).
31.

Id. § 14(4)(a)(I).

32.

Id. § 14(4)(b).

33.

Id. § 14(5)(a).

34. Id. § 14(10)(b).
35.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, No. 11SC676, 2012 WL
1940833 (Colo. Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://blogs.denverpost.com/crime/files/2011/10/BeinorColo-Sup-Ct-Petn-for-Cert-stamped.pdf.
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marijuana to treat his debilitating condition. 36 The physician produced “written
documentation,” defined in article XVIII, section 14 of the Colorado Constitution
as a “statement signed by a patient’s physician or copies of the patient’s pertinent
medical records.” 37 This documentation made Beinor eligible for a “registry
identification card,” which is issued by the state health agency and “identifies a
patient authorized to engage in the medical use of marijuana.” 38 With his
documentation, Beinor obtained and used marijuana to alleviate his pain.39
In 2010, Beinor was an employee of Service Group, Inc.40 His job was to sweep
Denver’s 16th Street Mall with a broom and dustpan.41 Pursuant to its random drugtesting policy, Service Group ordered Beinor to submit to a drug test, which he
failed.42 After testing positive for marijuana, Beinor was fired in February 2010.43
Beinor thereafter applied for state unemployment benefits.44 Under Colorado’s
unemployment compensation provision, an employee may be disqualified from
receiving benefits because of the “presence in an individual’s system, during working
hours, of not medically prescribed controlled substances . . . or a previously
established, written drug . . . policy of the employer.”45 Service Group did not dispute
that Beinor used marijuana for medical reasons.46 Nor did it claim that his medical
use of marijuana affected his performance on the job.47 Rather, Service Group argued
that it simply followed its written drug policy, which stated that any employee testing
positive for “illegal drugs” would be terminated.48
Beinor’s claim for unemployment benefits was initially denied, but a hearing
officer reversed that decision, noting that “[Beinor] has a state constitutional right to

36. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 972 (Colo. App. 2011).
37.

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(j) (defining “Written Documentation”); Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.

38. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(g) (defining “Registry identification card”). While Beinor had yet to

actually obtain the registry identification card, this fact was not significant. Beinor contended that he
simply had not yet received it and the unemployment hearing officer, who was responsible for finding
the facts, found that there was “no reliable evidence that . . . [Beinor] was not eligible for a medical
marijuana license.” Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.
39.

Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44. See id. at 972. See generally Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8-73-108 (West 2012) (explaining Colorado’s

unemployment compensation provisions, outlining both eligibility for and disqualification of benefits).
45.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8-73-108(5)(e)(IX.5) (West 2012).

46. See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.
47.

Id.

48. Id.
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use marijuana” and therefore was not at fault for the separation from his employment.49
Service Group appealed and a unanimous Industrial Claim Appeals Panel set aside
the hearing officer’s order.50 The Panel concluded that the Medical Marijuana
Amendment did not create an exception to the disqualification regarding benefits for
an employee who tests positive for the presence of a “not medically prescribed
controlled substance.”51 Although Beinor had a medical authorization, he did not
possess an actual prescription.52 The Medical Marijuana Amendment, however,
required a registry identification card to receive marijuana and did not require a
medical prescription.53 Accordingly, the Panel denied Beinor’s claim. 54 Beinor,
appearing pro se, appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.55 On August 18, 2011,
in a 2–1 opinion, that court upheld the Panel’s decision.56
The court of appeals reached its decision by addressing the two primary issues
raised by Beinor’s appeal. First, the court considered whether the language of the
unemployment statute disqualified Beinor from benefits.57 The court interpreted
Colorado’s unemployment law as establishing that a claimant could be disqualified
from benefits either because the employee tested positive for a “not medically
prescribed controlled substance” or because the employee violated an employer’s
49. Id. See generally How Do I Appeal an Unemployment Decision, Colo. Dep’t Labor & Emp’t, http://www.

colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDLE-UnempBenefits/CDLE/1251566393561 (last visited Aug. 20, 2012)
(explaining the appeals process for the disqualification of unemployment benefits).
50. See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.
51.

Id. The unemployment statute explains that an employee may be disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits because of the “presence in an individual’s system, during working hours, of not
medically prescribed controlled substances.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-73-108(5)(e)(IX.5) (West
2012). The unemployment statute refers to the statute governing pharmaceuticals and pharmacists to
define what “controlled substance” means. See id. The statute governing pharmaceuticals and
pharmacists indicates that “controlled substance” has the meaning of the phrase under the Colorado
Criminal Code, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-22-303(7) (West 2012), which defines a “controlled
substance” as “a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules I through V of part 2 of
this article, including cocaine, marijuana.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-102(5) (West 2012).

52.

See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.

53.

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(j) (defining “Written Documentation”).

54. See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 972.
55.

See id. at 971–72.

56. Id. at 973–78. After the court of appeals rendered its decision, Beinor, represented by counsel, submitted

a petition for Writ of Certiorari on October 3, 2011 asking the Supreme Court of Colorado to review
his case. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 3–23. The Deputy Attorney General
submitted a cross-petition for Writ of Certiorari, arguing that, given the extraordinary impact this case
will have, it is critical that the Supreme Court of Colorado create a binding precedent. See CrossPetition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–17, Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, No. 11SC676, 2012
WL 1940833 (Colo. May 29, 2012), available at http://blogs.denverpost.com/crime/files/2011/10/
Cross-Petition-for-Cert-with-exhibits.pdf. On May 29, 2012 both the petition and cross-petition for
certiorari were denied by Colorado’s Supreme Court; see Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2012
WL 1940833 (Colo. May 29, 2012).
57.

Beinor, 262 P.3d at 973–75; see Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-73-108 (West 2012) (describing both
eligibility for and disqualification from benefits under Colorado’s unemployment compensation statute).
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previously established written drug policy.58 Reading the unemployment statute
narrowly, the majority concluded that neither a registry card nor written
documentation from a physician constituted a prescription.59 Therefore, the court
found that the statute authorized the denial of unemployment benefits.60 The court
noted that the written document Beinor produced explicitly acknowledged that it
was “not a prescription,” and further emphasized that, in any case, Beinor’s physicians
could not “prescribe” marijuana because prescriptions are regulated by federal law.61
Under federal law, doctors are required to register with the federal Drug Enforcement
Agency and can prescribe only Schedule II through V controlled substances.62 Thus,
no Colorado physician can prescribe marijuana, which is a Schedule I controlled
substance.63 Additionally, the court pointed to the fact that the term “controlled
substance” was defined in Colorado’s Criminal Code to include marijuana, so that
even under Colorado law, physicians could not prescribe marijuana.64 Hence, the
court concluded that the denial of unemployment benefits was proper.65
Second, the court addressed whether the unemployment statute, which the court
had found to justify the denial of benefits, was itself unconstitutional insofar as it
violated Beinor’s rights under the constitution’s Medical Marijuana Amendment.66
Implicitly, the court was asked to decide whether Beinor had a constitutionally
conferred affirmative right to use medical marijuana or, conversely, whether the
Amendment provided him only the right not to be criminally prosecuted for using
marijuana for medical purposes.67 The majority interpreted the Medical Marijuana
Amendment as merely creating an exception to state criminal law, and not as
establishing an affirmative right to use marijuana under the conditions outlined in
58. Beinor, 262 P.3d at 973. Specifically, the relevant portion of the unemployment statute states that an

employee may be disqualified from benefits due to the “presence in an individual’s system, during
working hours, of not medically prescribed controlled substances, as defined in section 12-22-303(7),
C.R.S., or . . . written drug or alcohol policy of the employer.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-73-108(5)(e)
(IX.5) (West 2012).
59.

See Beinor, 262 P.3d 973–74.

60. See id. at 975.
61.

Id. at 973–75; see 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2006) (stating that marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug); see
also 21 C.F.R § 1301.13 (stating that, under the applicable federal law, a Schedule I drug, such as
marijuana, cannot be prescribed by a physician).

62. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.13(e)(1)(iv) (2012); see also Beinor, 262 P.3d at 973–74.
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2006) (stating that, under the applicable federal law, marijuana is a Schedule I

drug); see also Beinor, 262 P.3d at 973–74.
64. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-102(5) (West 2012) (defining a controlled substance as a “drug,

substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules I through V . . . including marijuana”); Beinor,
262 P.3d at 973.
65.

Beinor, 262 P.3d at 974–75.

66. Id. at 975–78.
67.

Id. at 972–73. For a background discussion on the differences between legalization and decriminalization
in regard to marijuana laws, see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1427–33 (2009).
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the Amendment.68 The majority examined the purpose of each provision, giving
great weight to the legislation enacted by the Colorado General Assembly shortly
after the Medical Marijuana Amendment was approved by voters to regulate the
medical marijuana program.69 The court found no ambiguity. Rather, it found that
the Amendment simply did not create a “constitutional right other than exemption
from [criminal] prosecution.” 70
The majority further found that the Amendment’s provision that “nothing in this
section shall require any employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in
any work place” was properly understood to mean that employers need not
“accommodate” a positive drug test result.71 Finding that the “Colorado Constitution
does not give medical marijuana users an unfettered right to violate employers’
policies,” the court implicitly conferred on all Colorado employers the right to deny
their employees the ability to use medical marijuana simply by adopting zerotolerance policies.72 Accordingly, the majority held that the Panel properly disqualified
Beinor from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.73
Judge Gabriel, in dissent, emphatically disagreed with the majority’s interpretation
of the Medical Marijuana Amendment and, consequently, with the majority’s
ultimate holding.74 Judge Gabriel argued that the constitutional Amendment could
be reasonably interpreted as creating a separate constitutional right to use marijuana,
in addition to establishing an exception to criminal prosecution, and was sufficiently
ambiguous to require the court to look to extrinsic evidence.75 Judge Gabriel relied
heavily on the publicly distributed Bluebook to ascertain the intent of voters and the
purpose of the Amendment.76 In Judge Gabriel’s view, the Bluebook made it clear
that voters intended to create an affirmative constitutional right to use marijuana
under prescribed conditions.77 Having established that medical marijuana use was, in
his view, constitutionally protected, Judge Gabriel’s dissent pointed out that the U.S.
Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly held that unemployment benefits could
not be conditioned on relinquishing a constitutionally protected right.78 Thus, Judge
68. See generally Beinor, 262 P.3d at 973–78.
69. See id. at 975–76 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-406.3 (West 2012)).
70. Id. at 976.
71.

Id. at 975–76 (citing Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(10)(b)).

72. Id. at 976.
73. Id. at 978.
74.

See id. at 978–82 (Gabriel, J., dissenting).

75. See id.
76. See id.
77.

See id. at 979.

78. See id. at 981–82; see, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (“[T]he

employee was forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment; the
forfeiture of unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful coercion to
bear on the employee’s choice.”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 708 (1981) (“A person may not
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Gabriel would have held that Beinor’s off-the-job use of medical marijuana could not
be the basis for denying him unemployment benefits.79
In Beinor, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a terminated employee could
properly be denied unemployment benefits based solely on the employee’s use of
“medical marijuana,” which is “lawful” under article XVIII, section 14 of the
Colorado Constitution.80 Addressing a question of first impression, the court
construed the Amendment as merely protecting patients from state criminal laws and
not as protecting a patient’s receipt of state benefits.81 This case comment contends
that the majority’s narrow interpretation of the Medical Marijuana Amendment
improperly treated the popularly enacted amendment as a product of the traditional
legislative process and, as a result, undermined Colorado’s citizens’ constitutionally
conferred right of voter initiatives. First, the majority erred when it concluded that
the statutory language of the Medical Marijuana Amendment was unambiguous.82
Second, the Bluebook that was distributed to voters demonstrates that the court’s
strained interpretation of the amendment allowed its preference to supplant the voice
and intent of voting citizens.83 If this holding stands, employees who avail themselves
of the protections of the Medical Marijuana Amendment will be faced with a gutwrenching decision: continue to use a lawful medication for a debilitating medical
condition but risk the loss of certain state benefits, or keep their jobs and state
benefits but abstain from using marijuana to alleviate their pain. Moreover, the
be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an
otherwise available public program.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“The ruling forces
[Sherbert] to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”).
79. Beinor, 262 P.3d at 981–82. Additionally, Judge Gabriel was unconvinced by the majority’s broad

interpretation of the “in any work place” language, which did not take the location where the marijuana
was actually ingested or possessed into consideration. Id. at 980–81 (citing Colo. Const. art. XVIII,
§ 14(10)(b)) (“Nothing in this section shall require any employer to accommodate the medical use of
marijuana in any work place.”). Judge Gabriel opined that the provision at issue referred “solely to the
acquisition, possession, production, use, or transportation of medical marijuana, or paraphernalia
related to it, in the workplace. [He did] not believe that these provisions encompass the presence of
marijuana in ones blood after the lawful use of medical marijuana at home.” Id. at 980 (citing Colo.
Const. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(b)) (clarifying the term “medical use,” which is defined within the
Amendment as “the acquisition, possession, production, use, or transportation of marijuana or
paraphernalia related to the administration of such marijuana to address the symptoms or effects of a
patient’s debilitating medical condition, which may be authorized only after a diagnosis of the patient’s
debilitating medical condition by a physician”). Thus, Judge Gabriel argued that this provision
unambiguously referred to use “in the workplace,” but did not unambiguously answer the question
before the court in Beinor. Id. at 980–81. While there are extensive arguments about what this provision
could mean, the majority’s denial of benefits turns on its interpretation of the criminal exception
provision. For this reason, further discussion of the “in the workplace” provision of the Amendment is
outside the scope of this comment.
80. See generally Beinor, 262 P.3d 970 (majority opinion).
81.

Id. at 972.

82. See infra notes 85–130 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 131–50 and accompanying text.
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holding of this court has consequences for an even larger number of stakeholders and
has implications that extend far beyond the issue of unemployment benefits .84
When a court is charged with interpreting a statute, it first decides whether the
issue presented can be resolved using just the statutory text itself.85 However, if the
text is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court
may then use extrinsic evidence to help it decipher what the legislative body intended
the statute to mean.86 When confronted with an ambiguous statute that has been
enacted by the legislature, the court will examine the statute’s legislative intent.87
The same examination of a law’s intent is required in the context of voter initiatives.
However, the theoretical framework for judicial interpretation of popularly enacted
laws remains largely unexamined in legal scholarship.88
The pool of interpretive sources a court can or should consult when searching for
the intent of voters may be different from that which is appropriate for traditionally
enacted legislation.89 Some experts argue that voter initiatives require greater judicial
deference because of the potential for public outrage that might cause the public to
question the court’s legitimacy following an unfavorable decision in conflict with the
electorate’s wishes.90 Some courts, too, have acknowledged that popular intent should
84. See infra notes 156–68 and accompanying text.
85. See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the

Legislative Process 9–19 (1997); see, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is
the language itself.”); Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146, 149 (Colo.
2005) (“In discharging our judicial function, we afford the language of constitutions and statutes their
ordinary and common meaning; we ascertain and give effect to their intent.”).
86. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 85, at 27–41, 50–56 (describing the circumstances in which courts use

extrinsic evidence); see, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195–212 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision clearly contravenes the intent of Congress as found in
the legislative history of the bill); State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 502 (Colo. 2000) (resorting to legislative
history to ascertain legislative intent).
87.

See In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99–1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999); see also
Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 978 (Colo. App. 2011).

88. See Schacter, supra note 7, at 108 (“[Legal scholars] have left largely unexamined the judicial

interpretation of popularly enacted laws: how courts construe direct legislation when litigants contest
statutory meaning rather than constitutionality.”).
89. Id. at 119 –23 (documenting the different sources a court uses to determine popular intent and how often

courts explicitly use these sources). For more information on Colorado’s interpretive methodology, see
In re Interrogatories Relating to the Great Outdoors Colo. Trust Fund, 913 P. 2d 533, 542 (Colo. 1996)
(“[I]n construing constitutional language, each clause and sentence must be presumed to have purpose
and use.”); Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 283 (Colo. 1996) (“Courts should consider the
amendment as a whole and, when possible, adopt an interpretation of the language which harmonizes
different constitutional provisions rather than an interpretation which would create a conflict between
such provisions.”).
90. See Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards 28–29 (Am. Pol.

Sci. Ass’n, Sept. 1999), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/
I&R%20Research%20and%20History/I&R%20Studies/Miller%20-%20Courts%20and%20I&R%20
IRI.pdf (“Recent cases suggest that the watchdog approach is gaining ground in the courts. But judicial
vigilance potentially comes at the cost of voter outrage. . . . If courts continue to invalidate voter-
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guide a court’s inquiry and that the court should aim to give effect to what it deems
to have been the voters’ objective in enacting the legislation.91 Nonetheless, despite
criticism, ballot initiatives have been treated by the courts as largely the same, for
interpretive purposes, as statutes adopted through the traditional legislative
processes.92 The established policy of judicial deference to the enacting body’s intent
is not, as evidenced by the holding in Beinor, always followed in practice.93
There are three main arguments that support the conclusion that the majority of
the court in Beinor erred in its conclusion that the Medical Marijuana Amendment
was unambiguous. First, in reaching its decision the majority concluded that the
Medical Marijuana Amendment was unambiguous only by narrowly interpreting the
meaning of the words contained in the amendment. Because the court found that the
state unemployment law allowed the denial of benefits to someone authorized to use
medical marijuana, the court next had to determine whether the Amendment, by its
terms, explicitly or implicitly overrode the unemployment provision.94 This, in turn,
approved initiatives at a high rate, there is a danger that public resentment against the judiciary will
grow.”); see, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing a
decision that invalidated California Proposition 209, the court noted that a “system which permits one
judge to block with the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the
integrity of our constitutional democracy. These principles of judicial review are no less true today than
in the days of Marbury v. Madison.”).
91.

See, e.g., Urbish v. Lamm, 761 P.2d 756, 760 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (“Because Amendment 3 was adopted
by popular vote, we must seek to determine what the people believed the amendment to mean when they
accepted it as their fundamental law.”); Estate of Turner v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 724 P.2d 1013,
1016 (Wash. 1986) (“[I]t is the function of this court to discern voter intent behind [the] Initiative . . . .”).

92.

See Schacter, supra note 7, at 109 (noting that the “gap in the literature about direct [voter] legislation is
both lamentable and surprising . . . . As these measures are applied and interpreted, they raise the same
problems of ambiguity and prompt the same kinds of litigation over interpretation that are so familiar in
the context of legislative law.”). For Colorado’s treatment of the appropriate standard to apply to voterenacted legislation, see Bolt v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Six, 898 P.2d 525, 532 (Colo. 1995); see
also Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 283 (Colo. 1996) (“Courts should not engage in a narrow
or technical reading of language contained in an initiated constitutional amendment if to do such would
defeat the intent of the people.”); Bolt, 898 P.2d at 532 (stating that when interpreting an initiative, an
“absurd result should be avoided”).

93.

Compare Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011), with Paul Grant,
Initiative & Referenda Institute, Citizens Initiatives Under Attack in Colorado, available at
http://w w w.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%20
History/I&R%20Studies/Grant%20-%20Citizens%20Initiatives%20Under%20Attack%20in%20
Colorado%20IRI.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (documenting recent attacks by Colorado courts on the
initiative process).

94. See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 975–77. The court’s first task in interpreting the Medical Marijuana Amendment

in Beinor was thus to determine whether the Amendment spoke directly to the issue of unemployment
benefits. See id. at 975. The most established principal of statutory interpretation, commonly known as
the “plain meaning rule,” suggests that a court first examine the plain text within the “four corners” of
the document to ascertain meaning. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 85, at 9; see, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth.
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (upholding the “ordinary meaning of plain language”); Lazy Dog
Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Colo. 1998) (“The so-called ‘four corners’
principle . . . provided that a court should not look beyond the instrument for any purpose unless it first
determined that the deed was ambiguous.”). In Beinor, there is no mention in the Amendment of
unemployment benefits, so it plainly did not.
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required the court to decide whether the Amendment merely decriminalized medical
marijuana use or whether it went further and “legalized” its use, subject to certain
limitations.95 Finding mere decriminalization, as the majority did, meant that the
Amendment did not conflict with or override the unemployment law’s prohibition
on a person receiving certain benefits where the use of marijuana occurred without a
prescription.96 The latter finding, that the Amendment “legalized” medical marijuana
use, would have established a constitutional right and overridden the unemployment
law’s limitations.97
Subsection (4)(a) of the Medical Marijuana Amendment reads, “A patient may
engage in the medical use of marijuana, with no more marijuana than is medically
necessary to address a debilitating medical condition. A patient’s medical use of
marijuana, within the following limits, is lawful,”98 which means “legal.”99 The courts
have recognized a difference between decriminalization and legalization.100
Decriminalization involves the removal of criminal penalties and therefore the
removal of the threat of incarceration and loss of freedom.101 For example, when
Connecticut decriminalized the possession of marijuana under one-half ounce, it did
not thereby create a right to possess marijuana, but rather made such possession a
criminal infraction and not a criminal act.102 In contrast, legalization means the
government has the ability to regulate use and distribution.103 Colorado made it
“lawful” to use marijuana for medical purposes, and thus created a right to use
medical marijuana within the prescribed conditions. Thus, the question is whether
“lawful” indicates that the Amendment arguably did more than remove a criminal

95. See Beinor, 262 P.3d at 975–76.
96. See id. at 975–77.
97.

See id. at 978–82 (Gabriel, J., dissenting).

98. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, §14(4)(a) (emphasis added).
99. See Black’s Law Dictionary 965 (9th ed. 2009) (defining lawful as “[n]ot contrary to law; permitted

by law. See legal”); see also Erich Goode, Between Politics and Reason: The Drug Legalization
Debate, 78 (1997) (“Legalization refers to a state licensing system more or less similar to that which
prevails for alcohol and tobacco.”).
100. See Sam Kamin & Christopher S. Morris, The Impact of the Decriminalization and

Legalization of Marijuana: An Immediate Look at the Cannabis Reform Movement, 2010
Aspatore Special Rep. 22 (2010) (explaining the difference between legalization and
decriminalization). Cf. People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 568 & n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining that California’s Proposition 215, which merely decriminalized the use of medical marijuana,
did not change its use from a crime to a “right”).
101. Decriminalize Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

decriminalize (last visited Aug. 21, 2012).
102. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21A-279(c) (West 2012).
103. See Cynthia S. Duncan, The Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 Conn. L.

Rev. 1701, 1731 (2009) (“Having failed to effectively exert control over marijuana availability and
marijuana use from the outside through prohibition, legalization exerts control from the inside-replacing
government prohibition of marijuana with government regulation.”).
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prohibition and created a right to use medical marijuana under the conditions
specified. At the very least the Amendment was ambiguous in this regard.
The Colorado Court of Appeals was bound to construe the Amendment by
giving meaning to every word it contained, using the ordinary meaning of the
Amendment’s words.104 The word “lawful” means “legal”; therefore the result of
making something lawful (when it previously was not) is to legalize, something
materially different than a mere exemption from criminal prosecution.105 Legalization
typically means that civil and other penalties cannot be imposed for engaging in a
given behavior.106 The majority noted that it was not empowered to “add or subtract
language from the express words of the amendment.”107 Yet, by construing the word
“lawful” to mean decriminalize rather than anything other than “legal,” the court
changed the apparent meaning of the Amendment, thereby allowing it to find that no
ambiguity existed and to avoid looking at extrinsic evidence that would have clarified
what the voters intended in approving the initiative.108
Second, had the court chosen to read the amendment as a harmonious whole, it
would have had to consider the possibility that the amendment was ambiguous and
could well have been interpreted to override statutory provisions such as those
contained in the unemployment law. The Colorado courts have noted that, when
interpreting a statute, it should be treated as a “holistic endeavor” and that unclear
text can often be clarified by looking at the entire statutory scheme.109 Subsection (5)
104. See Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146, 149 (Colo. 2005) (“We construe

[constitutional and statutory] provisions as a whole, giving effect to every word and term contained
therein, whenever possible.”).
105. See also Jordan Blair Woods, A Decade After Drug Decriminalization: What Can the United States Learn

from the Portuguese Model, 15 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 1, 6–14 (2011) (“There are three main legal
approaches to drug use, each of which has benefits and drawbacks. At one end of the spectrum is
criminalization. . . . At the other end of the spectrum is legalization.”).
106. Id. at 6 (“In a legalized regime, people are legally permitted to use drugs under regulated conditions

without the threat of criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions. In between these two options is
decriminalization. In a decriminalized regime, drug use is not a criminal offense, but may remain
subject to non-criminal sanctions (such as administrative sanctions).”).
107. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 975 (Colo. App. 2011) (citing Turbyne v. People,

151 P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007)).
108. However, the clear meaning of “legal” does not demonstrate that the text of the Medical Marijuana

Amendment as a whole is unambiguous. Subsection (2) creates an exemption from criminal prosecution
and, as I argue, subsection (4)(a) legalizes medical use. It is difficult to conjure up a scenario where
legalization would not automatically decriminalize and thus the two provisions are inconsistent. This
internal conflict, between the competing subsections, begets sufficient ambiguity in the text that the
court should have examined extrinsic evidence (i.e., the Bluebook) to ascertain what voters intended the
amendment to mean.
109. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)

(“Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is
used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear . . . .”) (citations omitted); Charnes v. Boom,
766 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (“[W]e must read and consider the statutory scheme as a
whole to give consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all its parts.”).
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(a) of the Medical Marijuana Amendment contains limitations on the right of
medical marijuana use.110 It begins, “[N]o patient shall . . . .” and then details the
various circumstances in which the use of medical marijuana is not protected from
criminal prosecution.111 These circumstances include engaging in use that would
endanger another person and using medical marijuana in public.112 The majority’s
reading of subsection (4) as merely decriminalizing use is diminished when the
statute is read as a whole. If the sole purpose of subsection (4) was to set the
permissible uses (“the limits beyond which prosecution is not exempted,”113 as the
majority wrote), then there is no reasonable way to differentiate subsections (4) and
(5)(a), which specify impermissible uses. By the majority’s logic, the distinction is
only that subsection (5)(a) is worded in the negative and subsection (4) is worded in
the affirmative, a reading that hardly gives full effect to the meaning of each clause.114
Subsection (2) of Medical Marijuana Amendment states that “except as otherwise
provided in subsections (5), (6), and (8) of this section, a patient . . . with a violation of
the state’s criminal laws related to the patient’s medical use of marijuana will be
deemed to have established an affirmative defense.”115 Subsections (5), (6) and (8)
generally pertain to use in public view or a use that endangers others,116 use by
minors,117 and misrepresentations to a physician or use of another person’s registry
identification card or fraudulent production of a registry identification card.118 The
majority found that subsection (4)(a) merely describes the limits of the state criminal
law exemption, and that subsection (4)(b) provides an affirmative defense of medical
necessity that “may” be raised when a patient possesses marijuana in excess of the
limit.119 But conspicuously lacking in the language of subsection (4)(b) is the word
“criminal.” Instead, subsection (4)(b) uses the term “charges of violation of state
law.”120 The omission of the word “criminal” in subsection (4)(b) suggests that its
affirmative defense was intended to apply beyond criminal law to other sorts of legal
110. See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(5)(a).
111. Id.
112. Id. (“No patient shall: (I) Engage in the medical use of marijuana in a way that endangers the health or

well-being of any person; or (II) Engage in the medical use of marijuana in plain view of, or in a place
open to, the general public.”).
113. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 975 (Colo. App. 2011).
114. Compare Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(5)(a) (“No patent shall . . . .”), with Beinor, 262 P.3d 970, at 975

(interpreting subsection 4(a) as merely “the limits beyond which prosecution is not exempted”).
115. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(2) (emphasis added).
116. See id. § 14(5)(a)–(b).
117. See id. § 14(6)(a)–(i).
118. See id. § 14(8)(a)–(d).
119. Id. § 14(4)(b) (“For quantities of marijuana in excess of these amounts, a patient or his or her primary

care-giver may raise as an affirmative defense to charges of violation of state law that such greater
amounts were medically necessary to address the patient’s debilitating medical condition.”) (emphasis
added); Beinor, 262 P.3d at 975.
120. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(4)(b).
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violations, such as use within one thousand feet of a public housing development.121
Thus, reading subsection (4)(b) together with subsection (2)(a) further strengthens
the argument that subsection (4)(a) is at least ambiguous and cannot be read as
unambiguously creating a defense only to criminal prosecution, rather than an
affirmative right to medical use of marijuana.122
Third, the majority’s reliance on the general assembly’s legislation, following
voter approval of the initiative, is another indication of the statute’s ambiguities.
Subsection (8) of the Amendment indicated that the general assembly shall “define
such terms and enact such legislation as may be necessary for implementation” of the
Medical Marijuana Amendment.123 In 2001, the Colorado General Assembly
enacted a statute that established criminal penalties for violating certain provisions of
the Amendment, such as penalties for counterfeiting registry identification cards.124
The majority’s reliance on the general assembly is misguided for two reasons. First,
the majority asserts that the general assembly’s construction, made shortly after
voters approved the constitutional amendment, is to be given great weight.125
However, it was the voters who passed the amendment, which the general assembly
later enacted, and it is the voters’ intent that should control. The general assembly
can only enact a bill based on the voter-approved amendment.126 The power of the
general assembly is not unlimited.127 It has neither the power to amend a constitutional
initiative,128 nor the power to enact “legislation which directly or indirectly impairs,
limits or destroys rights granted by self-executing constitutional provisions.”129 If, as
the majority contends, the Medical Marijuana Amendment unambiguously protects
patients from criminal prosecution only, then the court may not look to the general
assembly’s construction for guidance. Second, the general assembly’s construction
asserts both that the amendment “creates a limited exception to the criminal laws”
and “sets forth the lawful limits on the medical use.”130 Thus, the majority’s reliance
on the Colorado General Assembly’s reading of the Amendment is erroneous and
does not support the conclusion that the amendment is unambiguous in merely
decriminalizing medical use of marijuana.
121. See id.; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-407(2)(a) (West 2012).
122. As the Beinor dissent acknowledges, the majority’s reading of the Amendment may be a reasonable one,

but it is far from the only logical interpretation of the Amendment’s text. Beinor, 262 P.3d at 979
(Gabriel, J., dissenting). As the above analysis reveals, one might equally (or more reasonably) conclude,
as the dissent does, that “[c]onversely, one could reasonably read the Amendment as creating a right to
use medical marijuana (within established limits).” Id.
123. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(8).
124. Beinor, 262 P.3d at 975 (majority opinion) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-406.3(4) (West 2012)).
125. Id. at 976.
126. See id.
127. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(5).
128. See id.
129. Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 286 (Colo. 1996).
130. Beinor, 262 P.3d at 976 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-406.3(1) (West 2012)).
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Traditionally, when the legislature enacts statutes, the “legislative history,”
meaning the records attendant to passage including committee reports, transcripts of
legislative debates and the sponsor’s statements, is typically consulted to determine
legislative intent.131 This type of documentation does not exist, however, for voterenacted legislation.132 Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that “a court may
ascertain the intent of the voters by considering other relevant materials such as the
ballot title and submission clause and the biennial ‘Bluebook,’ which is the analysis of
ballot proposals prepared by the legislature.”133
All states that allow for ballot initiatives require a state government official to
make some information about the initiative public. In Colorado, ballot materials,
including the proposed title and arguments for and against a measure, are published
in the Bluebook.134 In states that prepare similar ballot pamphlets for voters, the
courts rely upon them as a legitimate source of authority.135 To the extent that popular
intent exists, the best-documented evidence of intent is contained in the Bluebook
because many voters rely on it to understand the meaning of the initiative that they
vote for or against.136
The text of the 2000 Bluebook describing the Medical Marijuana Amendment
indicates that voters approved a measure that would “legalize,” not just decriminalize,
the medical use of marijuana.137 Likely distributed to millions of voters across the
state of Colorado, the Bluebook’s very first page contained bullet points informing
voters that the amendment would allow diagnosed patients “to legally possess
marijuana.”138 The same bullet points made no mention of criminal prosecution or
131. Black’s Law Dictionary 983 (9th ed. 2009) (defining legislative history as “[t]he background and

events leading to the enactment of a statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates”).
132. See generally Schacter, supra note 7.
133. Beinor, 262 P.3d at 978–79 (Gabriel, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Submission of Interrogatories on

House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999)).
134. See also Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 952, 962–63 (Colo. App. Div. 2003) (explaining the Bluebook).
135. See Macravey v. Hamilton, 898 P.2d 1076, 1079 n.5 (Colo. 1995) (referring to the Bluebook, the court

explains that “[i]n past cases, we have found the Legislative Council’s publication to be a helpful source
equivalent to the legislative history of a proposed amendment”); Schacter, supra note 7, at 121–22
(explaining that forty-two percent of courts interpreting a statutory initiative either used ballot material
or identified ballot material as a legitimate source of extrinsic evidence to determine voters’ intent).
136. See Schacter, supra note 7, at 128–29. But see Schacter, supra note 7, at 128–29 (challenging the courts’

assumption that a popular intent exists or is discoverable).
137. See Bluebook 2000, supra note 16, at 1–3, 35; see also Beinor, 262 P.3d at 980.
138. According to the Bluebook, the proposed Medical Marijuana Amendment:

[A]llows patients diagnosed with a serious or chronic illness and their care-givers to
legally possess marijuana for medical purposes. For a patient unable to administer
marijuana to himself or herself, or for minors under 18, care-givers determine the
amount and frequency of use; allows a doctor to legally provide a seriously or chronically
ill patient with a written statement that the patient might benefit from medical use of
marijuana; and establishes a confidential state registry of patients and their care-givers
who are permitted to possess marijuana for medical purposes.
Bluebook 2000, supra note 16, at 1.
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state criminal law.139 Nor did the background section make explicit mention of
Colorado criminal laws, stating merely that this “proposal does not affect federal
criminal laws, but amends the Colorado Constitution to legalize the medical use of
marijuana for patients who have registered with the state.”140 In addition, the same
section stated that “[p]atients on the registry are allowed to legally acquire, possess,
use, grow, and transport marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia.”141
Furthermore, the Bluebook consistently refers to the amendment as legalizing
medical marijuana use, both in the “for” and the “against” arguments of the
Amendment. In addition to the brief summary, bullet points, and background to the
proposal, the Bluebook also contains an “arguments for” and “arguments against”
section to help voters understand the possible ramifications of the proposed
Amendment.142 The arguments for the proposed Amendment explain the benefits of
an additional treatment option.143 The text explains that the benefits of medical
marijuana for patients can be more effective than taking prescription drugs, with fewer
harmful side effects.144 The “arguments for” section contains no mention of the fact
that the Amendment is limited and will not affect workplace drug policies or public
benefits (and their likely cost to voters).145 Neither do the arguments against the
proposal suggest that the Amendment is limited to exempting marijuana users only
from criminal prosecution.146 Rather, the arguments against the Amendment explicitly
warn of the dangerous precedent set by “legaliz[ing]” medicines through popular vote.147
When construing a constitutional amendment that was passed by voter initiative,
courts must give effect to the intent of the electorate adopting the amendment.148 The
language contained in the Bluebook, which likely influenced many voters, runs contrary
to the majority’s interpretation of the Amendment in Beinor. The language contained in
the Bluebook suggests that this ballot measure would legalize and not merely decriminalize
the use of medical marijuana, a distinction that is crucial for medical marijuana patients
in need of unemployment benefits.149 Voters seem to have intended, as evidenced by the
Bluebook, to legalize medical marijuana usage for patients, affording them a right

139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added); see also Beinor, 262 P.3d at 980.
141. Bluebook 2000, supra note 16, at 1.
142. Id. at 2–3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
148. See Bolt v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Six, 898 P.2d 525, 532 (Colo. 1995).
149. Bluebook 2000, supra note 16, at 2–3.
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thereto.150 The court’s conclusion that the Amendment merely decriminalizes does not
comport with the language used in the Bluebook that voters relied on.
It is worth noting here that while the Bluebook is a more widely accepted
indicator of voter intent, there are other materials that may have aided the court. One
study of initiative measures found that voters rely almost entirely on mass media for
information about the ballot measure.151 While pre-ballot media advertising and
coverage is perhaps not a reliable indication of voter intent because it may be part of
a larger political agenda being promoted by the measure’s backers,152 media coverage
of the ballot measure after the vote is completed does not raise the same concerns.153
Thus, after the Colorado initiative had passed, the many headlines claiming that
voters had legalized medical marijuana use provide persuasive evidence that a
significant amount of the voting public believed they had done so.154 Mass media
does not merely shape, but can also reflect, public opinion.155
The decision in Beinor may appear injurious to only a relatively small class of
citizens, namely patients who are authorized to use medical marijuana in the state of
Colorado and may be fired for medical marijuana use and seek unemployment
benefits. However, the effect of this decision should not be underestimated.156 Both
critics and supporters of the Beinor decision recognize the tremendous impact this
case will have.157 As a direct result of this decision, a person suffering from a
150. Id.; see also Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 654 (Colo. 2004) (“Courts should not engage in a

narrow or technical construction of the initiated amendment if doing so would contravene the intent of
the electorate.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 5.
151. See David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting On Ballot Propositions In The United

States 133 (1984) (finding that regarding initiative measures that “voters rely almost entirely upon the
mass media for information about propositions”); see also Schacter, supra note 7, at 131–33 (explaining
the importance of Magleby’s findings).
152. See also Schacter, supra note 7, at 131–39 (discussing agenda setting).
153. See id. at 133–39.
154. Id. After results of the election were made official, many mass media sources ran stories indicating that

citizens of Colorado had legalized marijuana for medical use. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, The 2000
Elections: The Ballot Initiatives: Changes in Drug Policy and Gun Laws Are Picked, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
2000, at B12 (“In Nevada and Colorado, voters approved initiatives legalizing the medical use of
marijuana, bringing the total of states with such laws to eight.”); Ann Schrader, Marijuana Measure an
Apparent Winner, Denver Post, Nov. 8, 2000, at AA (“Amendment 20, the initiative to legalize
marijuana for medical use, was an apparent victor Tuesday.”).
155. See id. (discussing the reciprocal relationship between mass media and ballot initiatives); cf. id. at 138

(suggesting that it is “unseemly for courts to pay such conspicuous homage to popular prerogative while
ignoring the sources of information so central to the populace”).
156. As of May 31, 2012, the total number of patients who possessed valid Registry ID cards was 98,910. See

Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health, The Medical Marijuana Registry (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.
cdphe.state.co.us/hs/medicalmarijuana/statistics.html.
157. Compare Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 9 (“This Petition raises issues of substance not

heretofore determined by the Court concerning matters of great importance affecting Petitioner and
hundreds of thousands of other citizens and residents of Colorado. . . . A ruling on this issue would
further impact the rights of Colorado citizens and residents to education, financial assistance, licenses,
permits, and other State benefits otherwise available to all Colorado citizens and residents.”), with Cross-
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debilitating medical condition must choose between employment (and being eligible
for unemployment benefits) and a medically beneficial treatment that is potentially
safer than alternatives but results in a potential job loss and the loss of important state
benefits. In addition, employees in occupations requiring state licensure or certification,
ranging from midwives to plumbers, may be deprived of their right to engage in their
occupations if they use medical marijuana, because civil law provides for license
revocation for the “habitual” use of a “controlled substance.”158 Other civil benefits,
such as receipt of welfare benefits or public housing, are likely to be affected as well.159
Although difficult to measure prospectively, there may well be an impact on
voters’ willingness to engage in voting on ballot initiatives in the future and the
consequent diminution of this important form of democratic governance.160 Ballot
initiatives promote citizen participation, provide a mechanism for responding to
particularly controversial issues, and are useful in reacting to the failures of the
legislative process.161 Consequently, courts must construe ambiguous provisions or
language in accord with voter intent as much as possible.162 The Colorado Supreme
Court has expressly held that
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 8 –13 (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ published decision has
an impact that extends far beyond this case. Whether a right was created when Amendment 20 passed,
and if so, whether that right is narrow or broad and how it will impact everyday life for all Coloradans, is
a matter of great public interest and concern. . . . This uncertainty has real world implications on
unemployment compensation benefits and realms far beyond the unemployment statutes.”).
158. Numerous occupations subject individuals to discipline, including denial of licensure and registration,

for habitual use of a habit-forming drug, or a controlled substance. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
12-43-222(e) (West 2012) (Mental Health professionals including those practice of psychology, social
work, marriage and family therapy, licensed professional counseling, and addiction counseling); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-36-117(i) (West 2012) (physician or physician assistant); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-64-111(p) (West 2012) (veterinarians); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 12-45-113(h) (West 2012)
(landscape architect); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§12-33-117(d) (West 2012) (chiropractors); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 12-25-208(i) (West 2012) (engineers, surveyors, and architects); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§12-37-107(d) (West 2012) (direct-entry midwives); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-39-111(g) (West
2012) (nursing home administrators); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-8-132(d) (West 2012) (barbers and
cosmetologists); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 12-41-210(h) (West 2012) (physical therapists and assistants);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-58-110(l) (West 2012) (plumbers); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-2-123(p)
(West 2012) (accountants).
159. Because welfare recipients are required to work to receive benefits, yet cannot do so and use medical

marijuana if their employers have drug-testing and zero tolerance policies, they must choose between
welfare benefits and medical marijuana use. Additionally, those who live in public housing projects
(with or without established drug policies) may be forced to choose between their home and treatment
that involves medical marijuana use. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 26-02-111(e)(II) (West 2012)
(providing that a recipient of public assistance must “[d]emonstrate on a periodic and random basis that
he or she remains free of the use of alcohol or any nonprescribed controlled substance on a form verified
by the treatment program. Any person whose random test results are positive two times in any threemonth period shall be denied eligibility.”).
160. See also DuVivier, supra note 3, at 236. See generally Schacter, supra note 7, at 165.
161. See DuVivier, supra note 3, at 235–41.
162. See In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-98 No. 62, 961 P.2d 1077,

1080 (Colo. 1998).
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the initiative and referendum and statutes enacted in connection therewith
should be liberally construed . . . [so that] the constitutional right reserved to
the people ‘may be facilitated and not hampered by either technical statutory
provisions or technical construction thereof further than is necessary to fairly
guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of this
constitutional right.163

Another troubling aspect of this case is the court’s disregard for the purposes of
the Medical Marijuana Amendment and of the unemployment statute. By voting for
the Medical Marijuana Amendment, citizens supported patients’ rights to medicinally
treat their ailments; the primary justification for the use of medical marijuana in the
treatment of illness is that patients avoid needless suffering from chronic and
debilitating pain.164 In order to protect physicians from criminal prosecution, a doctor
signs “written documentation,” not a prescription.165 For practical purposes, this
official doctor’s note is equivalent to a prescription and the drafters of the amendment
employed this word-game to avoid conf licts with federal law, which regulates
“prescriptions.” Rather than reading this “documentation” as “equivalent to” a
prescription for purposes of the unemployment benefits scheme, the majority read
the term literally and, as a result, the claimant lost.166 In addition, the justification
for unemployment benefits is guided by the belief that unemployment insurance is
for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.167 For that
reason, most statutes distinguish between unemployment due to incompetence,
which leads to a grant of benefits, and unemployment due to misconduct, which
leads to denial.168 To equate a cancer or migraine headache sufferer who uses medical
marijuana with someone who commits theft or assault or to call medical marijuana
use “misconduct” seems plainly contrary to what the voters intended in passing the
Medical Marijuana Amendment to help individuals obtain effective treatment for
pain. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a person less at fault than a patient suffering
from a debilitating condition, exercising a seemingly protected choice to treat his or
her condition as he or she, together with a doctor, sees fit.

163. Brownlow v. Wunsch, 83 P.2d 775, 777 (Colo. 1938). This precise language has been used by the

Supreme Court of Colorado in at least eight other cases. See, e.g., In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission
Clause, and Summary For 1999-2000 No. 255, 4 P.3d 485 (Colo. 2000); Buckley v. Chilcutt, 968 P.2d
112 (Colo. 1998); Armstrong v. O’Toole, 917 P.2d 1274 (Colo. 1996); Fabec v. Beck, 922 P.2d 330
(Colo. 1996); McClellan v. Meyer, 900 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1995); Loonan v. Woodley, 882 P.2d 1380 (Colo.
1994); Montero v. Meyer, 795 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1990); Baker v. Bosworth, 222 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1950).
164. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Propriety of Employer’s Discharge of or Failure to Hire Employee

Due to Employee’s Use of Medical Marijuana, 57 A.L.R. 6th 285 (2010).
165. But cf. Brownlow, 83 P.2d at 777 (“[T]he initiative and referendum and statutes enacted in connection

therewith should be liberally construed. . . . [so that] the constitutional right reserved to the people ‘may be
facilitated and not hampered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof . . . .’”).
166. See, e.g., Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011).
167. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-73-108 (West 2012).
168. See, e.g., id.
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In reaching its conclusion, the majority frustrated the intent of the voting citizens
of Colorado and the holding, though based on very specific facts, has the potential to
jeopardize the ability of Colorado patients to use medical marijuana as a viable
treatment option in the future and may undermine the electorate’s confidence in the
voter initiative process.
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